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TAX CONSEQUENCES OF FUNDING TRUSTS WITH ENCUMBERED
PROPERTY: THE DEMISE OF SECTION 677
INTRODUCTION

The trust has long been a popular device for shifting the incidents of
property ownership for income tax purposes. Typically, an individual in a
high income tax bracket will transfer property to a trust for the benefit
of family members, which causes the income from such property to be
taxed either to the trust or to its beneficiaries, both of whom are presumably
in lower income tax brackets than the grantor. The success of such income
splitting schemes depends on the grantor's compliance with subpart E of
subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.' This subpart establishes
certain requirements 2 that the grantor must satisfy to avoid being attributed
with trust income.3
Within subpart E, section 677 generally provides that the grantor is
taxed on any income that. is or may be applied for his benefit. This provision has proven particularly troublesome to the operation of trusts funded
with encumbered property. If the grantor retains an interest as either remainderman or primary obligor for the encumbrance, trust income that is
used to discharge the indebtedness may be attributed to him under section
677. 4 Because of its limited scope, however, careful tax planners have been
able to circumvent this provision. This results in the grantor receiving tax
free economic benefits. 5 In these instances, the Commissioner has begun to
assert an alternative rationale that looks to the tax consequences of the
transfer in trust rather than the subsequent trust operation. Under this
approach the transfer transaction is treated as a part-sale, part-gift in which
1. Unless otherwise indicated all references to the Code are to the INT. Rav. CODE
OF 1954. Subpart E contains §§671-78 of the Code. Similar provisions were contained
in §§166 and 167 of the 1929 Code and certain regulations issued under §22(a) of the
1939 Code, commonly known as the Clifford and Mallinckrodt Regulations. TREAS. REG.
§§39.22(a)-21, 22 (1953) (now superceded by §§671-78). See Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U.S. 331, 1940-1 U.S.T.C. 9265 (1940); Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d 1, 1945-1 U.S.T.C.
9134 (8th Cir. 1945), aff'g 2 T.C. 1128 (1943), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945).
2. Basically the trust must be irrevocable for a term of more than 10 years or for
the life of the beneficiary. The grantor and nonadverse parties are restricted in their
administrative control over the trust and their power of disposition over the beneficial
enjoyment of the trust. In addition, the grantor is generally attributed with any income
distributed for his benefit.
3. Subpart E "provides rules to determine when a trust's income is to be taxed to
the grantor because of the grantor's substantial dominion and control of the trust property
or income." S. REP. No. 1622, to accompany H.R. 8300 (Pub. L. No. 591), 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 86 (1954).
4. The Commissioner has primarily argued that the payment of these obligations is
either a discharge of the grantor's legal obligation when he is personally liable on the
indebtedness or an accumulation of income for the future benefit of the grantor when
he has retained a reversionary interest in the trust corpus.
5. Section 677 appears to be inapplicable if the grantor avoids personal liability on
the encumbering debt, either by negotiating a nonrecourse loan or by providing that
the trust assume primary liability for the debt. Section 677 has also been held inapplicable
if the encumbrance is discharged with funds other than trust income.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 5
1976]

ATTRIBUTION OF INCOME UNDER SECTION 677

the grantor realizes the amount of the encumbrance and recognizes gain to
the extent this amount exceeds his basis.6 The impact of this approach has
been greatly enhanced by the decision of Johnson v. Commissioner 7in which
the Sixth Circuit held the transfer in trust of encumbered property to be
within the parameters of the Crane doctrine.8 It is uncertain, however, which
theory the Commissioner will continue to assert in the future.9
The focus of this commentary is on the application of section 677 to
the operation of encumbered trusts. The following text examines the effectiveness of this provision in determining the proper tax consequences in various
scenarios and explores the extent of its inherent limitations. While a complete
analysis of the part-sale, part-gift concept is beyond the scope of this work, 0
this approach is examined in regard to its effect on the continued utilization
of section 677. Finally, this commentary concludes that section 677 is
functionally inadequate and that the part-sale, part-gift concept should be
adopted as the appropriate method of determining the tax consequences of
funding trusts with encumbered property.
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF TRUST OPERATION: THE TRADITIONAL

APPROACH UNDER SECTION 677
Section 677(a) provides in part:
"The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust...
whose income without the approval or consent of any adverse party
is, or, in the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both,
may be(1) distributed to the grantor or the grantor's spouse;
(2) held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor
or the grantor's spouse .
"
The application of this provision triggers section 671, which attributes the
grantor with all items of income, deductions, and tax credits arising from
the pertinent portion of the trust."'
The application of section 677 in instances involving the satisfaction of
trust encumbrances is based on two fundamental prerequisites: the realization
of trust income and the utilization of such income for the benefit of the
grantor. To fulfill the latter requirement, the grantor must retain some
6. Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 422, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9475 (N.D. Miss. 1971),
aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
7. 495 F.2d 1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 US. 1040 (1975).
8. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 1947-1 U.S.T.C.
9217 (1947). This case
established the fundamental principle that on the sale of encumbered property the sum of the
encumbrance is included in the amount realized, regardless of whether the seller is
personally liable for the indebtedness or whether the buyer formally assumes the liability.
9. Compare Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), affd per curiam, 491 F.2d .1406 (5th Cir.
1974) with Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 422, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9475 (N.D. Miss.
1971), and Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (6th Cir. 1974).
10. For a more complete analysis of the part-sale, part-gift concept, see Note, Tax
Consequences of Encumbered Gifts: The Advent of Crane, 29 U. FxA. L. REv.
(1977).
11. See TREAs. REG. §1.671-3.
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interest in the trust through which he will accrue an economic benefit upon
the discharge of the encumbrance. Generally, the Commissioner has successfully asserted that such an interest exists in two circumstances. The first
instance is when the grantor retains a reversionary interest so that the
payment of the encumbrance increases the value of the equity interest that
he will ultimately acquire on reversion. The second instance is when the
grantor remains personally liable on the indebtedness so that the payment
of the debt is a discharge of his legal obligation. However, if the above
prerequisite is satisfied, the application of section 677 is still, by definition,
conditioned on the requirement that the benefit to the grantor accrues from
the distribution or accumulation of trust income. Thus, if funds other
than trust income are used to satisfy the encumbrance, the benefit to the
grantor, if any, does not appear to come within the purview of section 677.
BENEFIT TO GRANTOR FROM SATISFIED ENCUMBRANCE

Enhanced Reversionary Interest
Under section 673, a grantor who retains a reversionary interest is treated
as the owner of the trust unless such interest takes effect more than 10 years
after the property's transfer in trust or on the death of the income beneficiary.
In these instances the grantor will not be treated as the owner of the trust
income;12 nevertheless, he is still considered the owner of the trust corpus
for purposes of section 677.13 Thus, while the grantor is not attributed with
ordinary trust income, he is taxed with income allocable to corpus because
such income is accumulated for future distribution to him within the meaning
of section 677(a)(2). 14 For this reason, capital gains from the sale of trust
assets are taxed to the grantor who retains a reversion if such gains are
allocable to corpus. x5 Since income applied toward indebtedness encumbering
trust assets is properly allocable to corpus, it is likewise an accumulation of
income for future distribution to the grantor. 6
While the above reasoning is sound, the appropriateness of the result is
questionable. Section 677(a)(2) would require the grantor to include the entire
amount of the debt payments in his current income;" however, the trust
12. Id. §l.675(a)-l(a).
13. Id.
14. Id. §1.671-3(b)(2).
15. Id. §l.673(a)-l(a).
16. But see Riggs National Bank v. United States, 352 F.2d 812, 1965-2 U.S.T.C.
9728 (Ct. Cl. 1965). The trust corpus was devised to charity, but the provisions of the
will were held inapplicable to trust income that passed by intestacy to the decedent's
heirs. The trustee sought to take a charitable deduction on income applied toward
trust encumbrances, contending that such income was also permanently set aside for
charity since the ultimate charitable devise was increased. The court held that the indirect
connection was too remote to be considered a "permanent setting aside for charity" and
therefore denied the deduction. In view of the fact that the primary purpose of section
677 is to tax the grantor on realized income rather than to allow a deduction from
gross income, it seems unlikely that a court would construe the provision as narrowly as
the holding above.

17. Tp.As. REG . §1.677(a)-1(f).
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also benefits from the payments by retaining the present income interest
that is dependent on the timely satisfaction of the encumbrances. To the
extent that the grantor is taxed on the portion of the payments accruing to
the benefit of the trust, the above result appears inequitable.
An alternative theory for the application of section 677 posits that debt
payments accrue to the benefit of the grantor only to the extent that they
currently reduce the lien encumbering his reversionary interest.' s Under this
rationale the grantor would be taxed with a fractional share of each payment
determined by the proportion that the value of his reversionary interest bore
to the value of the full estate.' 9 Thus, instead of the entire payment being
an accumulation for future distribution, only the appropriate share would
be characterized as a present constructive distribution to the grantor. For
example, assume that a grantor creates a short term trust for 10 years and a
month, retaining the reversionary interest in himself. Further assume that
in the first year the full value of the trust corpus is $100, $75 being
the value of the income interest for the term of the trust and $25 being
the value of the remainder or reversionary interest. In the first year, the
grantor would be attributed with 1/4 of the amount of trust income paid
toward encumbering debts. If in the final year of the trust the value of
the income interest had declined to $10 while the reversion had increased in
value of $90, the grantor would be taxed on 9/10 of each debt payment.
Unlike the previous rationale, this approach does not ignore the benefit
to the trust and its income beneficiaries; instead, the trust is attributed
income in proportion to the value of its income interest.
No decision has fully articulated either of the above rationales for
applying section 677.20 While the first theory is supported by the statutory
scheme of the Code, the second approach appears to be the most equitable
and realistic. It is, therefore, suggested that the latter rationale should be
the favored approach.
DischargedLegal Obligations
The second instance in which the grantor may receive a taxable benefit
18. Cf. Herff v. Rountree, 140 F. Supp. 201, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. 19359 (M.D. Tenn. 1956).
19. Id. at 206, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. at 54,882.
20. The lack of a clear rationale for determining the tax consequences of retaining
a reversionary interest in encumbered trusts has resulted in confused and conflicting
decisions. For example, in Jenn v. United States, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 9264 (S.D. Ind. 1970),
the taxpayer triggered §677 in two ways: by remaining personally liable for the mortgage
and by retaining a reversionary interest in the trust property. The court reasoned that
since the entire amount of trust income was applied toward the mortgage, and since
the mortgage was the legal obligation of the grantor, the entire amount of trust income
was attributable to the grantor. However, in the last of several years being considered,
the grantor relinquished 1/3 of his reversionary interest. For reasons left unclear by the
opinion, the court concluded that by relinquishing this reversion the grantor ceased
to be a beneficiary of that portion of the trust and allowed the attribution of only 2/3
of the income in the final year. It would appear that the relinquishment of the
reversionary interest would not affect the grantor's personal liability on the encumbering
indebtedness and that the grantor would continue to be attributed with trust income
on the separate basis of the discharge of his legal obligation.
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from the application of trust income toward an encumbrance occurs when
he remains personally liable for the indebtedness. In this circumstance, the
Commissioner asserts that the payment of the encumbering debt constitutes
a constructive distribution to the grantor in the form of a discharged legal
obligation. 21 By necessity, this application of section 677 is dependent on
the nature of the grantor's liability for the encumbrance. Under the prevailing
view, the grantor must be primarily liable for the indebtedness to realize a
taxable benefit from its discharge.2 2 Therefore, great significance has been
placed on the legal technicalities that determine the grantor's personal liability
subsequent to the transfer in trust. In light of the economic realities of
mortgage financing, the above approach exalts form over substance and has
resulted in inconsistent and unrealistic decisions.23
The basic premise of this application of section 677 is that the discharge
of a legal obligation constitutes gross income to the obligor. This rule was
established in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,24 in which the Supreme
Court held that an employer's payment of an employee's taxes was income
to the employee in the amount of the taxes paid. The same rule was
applied in Douglas v. Willcutts,2s in which the grantor of a trust was taxed
on trust income used to satisfy his alimony obligations. This reasoning has
been incorporated into section 677 by regulations that expressly trigger the
provision on the discharge of the grantor's legal obligations. 26
In the typical fact setting assets encumbered by the grantor's personal
debts are transferred in trust without a formal assumption of liability by
the trustee. Thus, the grantor remains legally liable, and the payment of the
indebtedness, by definition, is a discharge of his legal obligation.2 Neverthe-

21.

See. e.g., Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir.

1974).
22. In Rev. Rul. 54-516, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 54, 56 the Commissioner stated that "if
the Grantor remains liable in any capacity, other than as trustee, for the mortgage on

real estate transferred to the trust, any income of the trust which is used to pay principal
or interest on such mortgage will be taxable to him." This language would appear to
encompass the capacity of a surety, but no decision has held a surety to realize a taxable

benefit on the trustee's discharge of the obligation he guarantees. To do so would lead
to the absurd result of finding that both the primary debtor and the surety realized the
same benefit on the discharge of the indebtedness; moreover, the surety would be taxed with

income whenever the actual debtor repaid his own obligation. Since this Revenue Ruling
has never been asserted as authority for such a proposition, it is assumed that the Commissioner will not do so in the future. Furthermore, the Commissioner to date has not
required a novation from the lender, in addition to the assumption of liability, even

though the lender may generally hold either the original obligor or the assuming party
primarily liable unless consent to the assumption is granted.
23. See text accompanying notes 37-44 infra.
24. 279 U.S. 716, 1 U.S.T.C. 408 (1929).
25. 296 U.S. 1, 1936-1 U.S.T.C. 9002 (1935).
26. TREAs.

REG.

§1.677(a)-1(d).

27. See, e.g., Lucy A. Blumenthal, 30 B.T.A. 591 (1934), rev'd, 76 F.2d 507, 1935-1 U.S.T.C.
9270

(2d Cir.), vacated per curiam, 296

U.S. 552

(1935)

(reinstating

the

B.T.A.

opinion).
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less, courts have questioned the reality of this liability when the debt is fully
2 8
secured by the property transferred in trust.
Other examples raise even more troublesome obstacles to section 677. If
the primary liability is formally assumed by the trust, then the grantor has
no remaining obligation to which subsequent trust income may be applied. 29
Furthermore, in the instance of a nonrecourse loan, for which the grantor is
not personally liable on the debt, there appears to be no legal obligation to
be assumed or discharged. 0 The varying effectiveness of section 677 must be
examined in each of these circumstances.
Liability Retained by Grantor
The significance of the grantor's personal liability was demonstrated in
the classic case of Helvering v. Blumenthal.31 The taxpayer established an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of her children. Stock worth 5300,000 was
transferred in trust subject to a personal note with a balance due of $33,000.
The trustee was directed to pay the debt on receipt of accumulated but undeclared dividends. The Board of Tax Appeals found that without an
express assumption the grantor remained primarily liable on the note; therefore, she was properly taxed on trust income to the extent it was used to
32
satisfy her indebtedness.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the Board of Tax Appeals' 33
decision and concluded that "[t]he effect of transferring this stock, subject
to the debt, was to make the stock the primary fund to meet the obligation
and to place the [grantor] in the relation of surety only." 4 In support of this
position the court noted: (1) the grantor received no enrichment since no
income or reversionary interest was retained; (2) the bank holding the
note customarily looked to the security prior .to demanding personal payment, and since the collateral was worth approximately ten times the amount
of the debt, there was virtually no possibility of a personal demand for
satisfaction; (3) the trustee accepted the obligation to make the payment
and the bank acquiesced to this arrangement; and finally (4) under New York
law, "[w]here a mortgagor conveys mortgaged premises subject to a mortgage,
even though there be no covenant on the part of the grantee to pay, the
land remains the primary fund of the debt and to the extent of its value
'' 5
the grantee stands in the relation of principal debtor."

28. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 507, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. 9270 (2d. Cir.),
vacated per curiam, 296 US. 552 (1935). See also text accompanying notes 44-48 infra.
29. See, e.g., Edwards v. Greenwald, 217 F.2d 632, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 9114 (5th Cir.
1954). See also text accompanying notes 50-53 infra.
30. Cf., e.g., Loeb v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1072 (1945), aff'd, 159 F.2d 549 (7th Cir.
1946). See also note 55 infra.
31. 296 U.S. 552 (1935), vacating per curiam, 76 F.2d 507, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. 9270 (2d
Cir. 1935), reinstating 30 B.T.A. 591 (1934).
32. Lucy A. Blumenthal, 30 B.TA. 591 (1934).
33. Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 507, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. 9270 (2d Cir. 1935).
34. Id. at 508, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. 9270, at 9760.
35. Id.
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Unconvinced by these arguments, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam
decision, reversed the circuit court on the authority of Douglas v. Willcutts
36
and reinstated the holdings of the Board of Tax Appeals. Unfortunately,
the absence of a written opinion leaves open to speculation the specific
reasoning of the Court; moreover, since grantor liability is determined by
state law, courts in other jurisdictions have reached different conclusions
on similar facts.
In Estate of Hays v. Commissioner,37 the Service sought to include trust
property in the gross estate of a deceased grantor. Despite the estate tax
context, the fundamental issue, as in Blumenthal, was whether trust income
had been applied toward the legal obligation of the grantor. The property
in question had been transferred in trust subject to a mortgage. Although
there was no evidence in the terms of the trust or elsewhere that the grantor
intended the trustee to assume the primary liability for the indebtedness,
the instrument did require the trustee to make mortgage payments with
trust income. The applicable state law provided that the acceptance of a
trust with the obligation to make the payments on a debt was sufficient to
38
constitute an assumption of primary liability. Following this rule, the
Fifth Circuit found the grantor to be a surety with only remote liability,
contingent not only on the default of the trust but also on the existence
of a deficiency after the foreclosure sale. s9 The court held that the discharge
of such a contingent liability was too remote to constitute a taxable benefit to
the grantor.

40

In subsequent decisions the Fifth Circuit has followed Estate of Hays
41
and distinguished Blumenthal on the grounds of state law. Even the
Commissioner has shown remarkable flexibility by arguing whichever side
42
of the controversy results in the greatest revenue. Nevertheless, Blumenthal
4
is still viable and has been followed as recently as 1974. 3 While this continued
reliance on a formalistic assumption of liability may be technically defensible,
the results obviously have been inconsistent from state to state.
36. Helvering v. Blumenthal, 296 U.S. 552 (1935).
37. 181 F.2d 169, 1950-1 U.S.T.C. 10,762 (5th Cir. 1950).
38. Id. at 171, 1950-1 U.S.T.C. 110,762, at 12,929.
39. ld.
40. Id.
41. See Edwards v. Greenwald, 217 F.2d 632, 634, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 19114, at 54,138-39
(5th Cir. 1954); see Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 111, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19475,
at 86,698 (D.C. Miss. 1971), af_'d per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
42. See Walther v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 708, 1963-1 U.S.T.C. 9449 (7th Cir. 1963).
The taxpayer expressly retained personal liability for a mortgage encumbering property
transferred in trust and then claimed an interest deduction for payments made on the
mortgage. The Commissioner asserted the exact argument rejected by the Supreme Court
in Blumenthal: that the transfer of the encumbered property transformed the grantor

from principal debtor to surety. Accordingly, it was asserted that the mortgage payments
were voluntary and that the interest deduction should be disallowed. The Seventh Circuit,
however, found that under state law

the

status of the

mortgagor

was unchanged

by the transfer without a formal assumption and allowed the deduction. Id. at 710, 1963-1
U.S.T.C. 9449, at 88,220.
43. See Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289, 301, aff'd per curiam, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir.
1972), acquiesced in, 1973-2 GUM. BULL. 4.
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Other courts have recognized that the form of the transaction does not
always reflect the economic realities of the grantor-grantee relationship.44
As a general rule, the mortgaged property is the primary security for the
debt. 5 Thus, even though the grantor remains personally liable after the
transfer, he can still look to the property subject to the mortgage for satisfaction of the obligation. Consequently, to the extent of the value of such
property, the grantor may be characterized as a "quasi surety."4 6 This view
conforms to the economic reality underpinning the transaction - that the
grantor will never actually have to pay the debt himself so long as it is

secured by collateral of equal or greater value.4

7

This reality was clearly

evident in Blumenthal, where the debt was secured by stock worth 10
times the amount due." Under these circumstances, it was virtually im-

possible for the grantor to be subjected to personal liability. By giving away
the collateral, the grantor, in substance, transferred the liability for the
encumbrance. Of course, if the value of the collateral had declined below the
amount of the debt, the grantor would have been liable for the difference.
Barring such an eventuality, the payment of the debt subsequent to the
transfer was an illusory benefit to the grantor and should not have been
considered a constructive distribution of trust income within the meaning

of section 677.
Liability Assumed by the Trust
The limitations of section 677 are more clearly demonstrated when the
trustee expressly assumes full liability for the grantor's personal obligations.
Here the subsequent application of trust income toward the encumbering
debt discharges only the trustee's legal obligation. There is no basis under
section 677 for attributing any trust income to the grantor because he is

no longer primarily liable. Certainly the grantor in Blumenthal could have
44. See Herff v. Rountree, 140 F. Supp. 201, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. %9359 (M.D. Tenn. 1956).
45. Id. at 205-06, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. %9359, at 54,881-82.
46. Id.
47. The rationale of Herff is surprisingly compatible with the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 1947-1 U.S.T.C.
19217 (1947). See note 8 supra. In Crane the Court reasoned that the owner of property
worth more than an encumbering mortgage is under an economic compulsion to pay
the debt rather than surrender the property. Thus, regardless of the legal liability, he
would treat the mortgage as if it were his own debt. On transfer of the property there
would be an assumption of liability, at least for tax purposes, since the new owner
would be under the same economic compulsion. Therefore, in Crane there is an implied
relief from liability because the new owner presumably will pay the debt so long as the
property is worth more than the encumbrance. In Herff there is an implied relief from
liability because even if the new owner does not pay the debt, the liquidation proceeds from
the property will repay the obligation so long as the property is worth more than
the encumbrance. The results are essentially the same except that Crane assumes the new
owner will pay the debt, and Herff assumes that he will not. In both cases there is
implied relief from liability so long as the property transferred is worth more than the
indebtedness.
48. Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 507, 508, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. 19270, at 9759 (2d
Cir. 1935).
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required the trustee to formally assume full liability. This would have
been a negligible risk to the trustee since the accrued dividends at the time
of the transfer almost equaled the balance due on the note. 49 In either case,
however, the benefit to the grantor would have been essentially the same.
She would have been relieved of liability either on the payment of the debt
with trust income or on the assumption of the liability at the time of the
transfer. Despite this economic reality, the application of section 677 would
have the inconsistent result of taxing the grantor only in the former instance.
Where the assumption issue arose, early decisions failed to recognize
the true nature of the transaction. In Edwards v. Greenwald,5° two individuals
acquired separate partnership interests in exchange for their personal notes.
According to a prearranged plan, they immediately placed these interests in
an irrevocable trust for the sole benefit of their children. The trust instruments
named the grantors as trustees and provided for the assumption of the
notes by the trustees in their representative capacity. The Service sought
to tax the grantors on the subsequent payment of the notes with trust
income on the authority of Blumenthal, but following Estate of Hays, the
Fifth Circuit distinguished Blumenthal on the basis of a valid assumption of
liability. 5' Additionally, the court noted that there was no independent
and preexisting encumbrance, rather "the indebtedness of the trustee individually [meaning the taxpayers personally] was incurred contemporaneously
with the establishment of the trusts and was incurred solely for the accommodation of the trusts and under the trust instruments no benefit or right to
receive income was reserved to the trustees as individuals."5 2 Finding no
pecuniary benefit accruing to the grantors, the Fifth Circuit refused to
attribute the trust income to them.
Although the court in Greenwald reached the correct result, their reasoning
did not encompass the fundamental issues raised by an assumption of
liability.53 Under the rationale of Greenwald, it is unclear whether an assumption of the debt would have constituted a taxable benefit if the notes had
been executed at a time prior to the transfer in trust. Moreover, the court
apparently would have taxed the grantors had they remained primarily liable
on the notes, but it is unclear why the lump sum assumption of an obligation
results in less of a benefit than the piecemeal discharge of the debt from
periodic installments of trust income.
The Fifth Circuit's inability to clearly articulate the rationale for the
holding in Greenwald stems from its failure to comprehend the dichotomy
between the tax consequences arising from the operation of the trust and
those arising from the transfer transaction. When personal liability is assumed
49. Id.
50. 217 F.2d 632, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 19114 (5th Cir. 1954).
51. Id. at 634, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 9114, at 54,138-39.
52. Id. at 634, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 19114, at 54,138.
53. The court was obviously impressed with the fact that the grantor did not benefit
from the proceeds of the loan since they were applied entirely for the benefit of the
trust. Nevertheless, the benefit traditionally taxed by § 677 arises from the relief
from liability, not from the use of the borrowed funds. The court ignored the benefit to
the taxpayer arising from the trustee's assumption of his personal liability.
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by the trustee, the benefit to the grantor is essentially the same as if the
indebtedness were fully discharged, but this benefit is received in the transfer
transaction. Since section 677 looks solely to the tax consequences arising
from the subsequent operation of the trust, it is ineffective in detecting
54
the true benefit realized by the grantor.
Absence of PersonalLiability
The dispute surrounding the assumption of liability becomes irrelevant
in the instance of a nonrecourse encumbrance if the grantor has no
personal liability for the trust to assume. Here the limitations of section
677 are manifest. After the transfer, the grantor has no further interest
or obligation in regard to the trust property and receives no benefit from the
discharge of its encumbrances.55 Presumably, the grantor in Blumenthal
could have negotiated a nonrecourse loan secured only by the stock as
collateral, rather than her personal promise. Despite the substantial similarities
in the net result, section 677 would appear inapplicable when the grantor
had no legal liability for the debt. Like an assumption of liability, the
benefit, if any, accruing to the grantor arises from the transfer in trust,
not the operation of the trust. Even though the grantor is not personally liable
prior to the transfer, he is burdened with the responsibility of paying the
indebtedness or ultimately surrendering his property. After the transfer, this
54. Under the part-sale, part-gift approach the grantor would also recognize no
trust. Nevertheless, the benefit traditionally taxed by §677 arises from the relief
gain, but the rationale for this result is clear. Because the grantor's note was for the full
purchase price, this was also the amount of his cost basis in the property. Since amount
realized equaled basis, no gain resulted. The contemporaneousness of the transactions was
only relevant because it insured the equality between the encumbrance and basis. The same
result would obtain if the note had been executed before the transfer so long as the
amount of the note was still equal to the basis; however, gain would occur if the
grantor had depreciated his basis without reducing the balance due on the note. This
gain would reflect the tax benefit that had accrued to the grantor in the form of
depreciation deductions from gross income. See Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106,
1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9475 (N.D. Miss. 1971), affd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
55. But see Herbert A. Loeb, 5 T.C. 1072 (1945). In that case a creditor agreed
to relieve the taxpayer of personal liability on his debts in exchange for a lien on certain
stock, plus the right to 75% of the dividends from such stock for a period of 10 years.
When the securities were subsequently transferred in trust, the Commissioner sought to
attribute the grantor with the dividend income paid to the creditor by the terms of. the
agreement. The grantor argued that since he had no personal liability, the payments
were not discharging his legal obligations. The court, however, concluded that the grantor
had been released from personal liability on the indebtedness by "assuming for his own
benefit a new and different obligation-the obligation to pay over the stipulated percentage of the dividend." Id. at 1077. Thus, the dividend payments were found to be
discharging the grantor's new obligation and were attributed to him under §167 (now
§677). It appears that the limitations of §167 forced the court in Loeb to utilize rather
unrealistic reasoning. On the transfer of ownership, it was the trustee, not the grantor,
who was legally obligated to pay the, dividends to the creditor. It is clear that if the
dividend had been withheld, the creditor's cause of action would have been against
the trustee alone. The discharge of this obligation was of no benefit to the' grantor, and
he hould not have been attributed with the income under §167,
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burden is assumed by the trustee as the new owner of the property securing
the indebtedness. The relief from this obligation is the benefit enjoyed by
the grantor, but the transfer transaction in which this benefit is received is
not within the purview of section 677. Thus, that provision is ineffective in
accurately determining the correct tax consequences of such events. 56
Source of Trust Funds That Satisfied Encumbrance
If the Commissioner, in his search for a taxable benefit, was frustrated
by assumptions of liability and nonrecourse encumbrances, he must have
been exasperated by the tax consequences of discharging an encumbrance
with funds other than trust income. Since the basic purpose of section 677
is to attribute to the grantor any trust income that may be applied for his
benefit, the realization of income is an absolute necessity. Without trust
income, section 677 is, by definition, inapplicable. 5 7
Recognizing the potential of this feature, ingenious tax counselors began
to structure trusts so that cash could be generated without the realization
of income. The most popular procedure is to discharge the indebtedness with
proceeds from the sale or encumbrance of trust assets. 58 The trustee's receipt
of borrowed money is not income because the concurrent obligation to repay
the loan negates any increase in the net worth of the trust.59 Similarly, the
sale of trust assets normally does not create trust income, rather such proceeds
are generally allocable to corpus. 60 However, the use of these funds to pay
encumbering debts extinguishes any obligation that may have been retained. If
this is accomplished prior to the realization of trust income, then section 677 is
effectively avoided. 61 Subsequent trust income used to repay the borrowed
money discharges only the obligation of the trust, not the grantor.6 2 Thus,
if the trustee in Blumenthal had paid the encumbering notes with funds other
than trust income, apparently section 677 would have been inapplicable
regardless of her personal liability.

56. In the part-sale, part-gift approach, this transaction is resolved by applying
the Crane doctrine, which results in the realization of the entire amount of the nonrecourse debt and the recognition of gain, if any, to the extent that such amount
exceeded the grantor's basis. See notes 8, 47 supra. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495
F.2d 1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1975).
57. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §677(a) reads in part: "The grantor shall be treated as
the owner of any portion of a trust . . . whose income . . . is, or . . . may be
distributed to the grantor.... ." (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., Lowenstein, Federal Tax Implications of Gifts Net of Gift Tax, 50 TAXES
525 (1972); Rief, Donee-Paid Gift Taxes; Some Considerations, 58 A.B.A.J. 1325 (1972).
59. Cf. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 9308
(1955); Woodsam Associates v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 1952-2 U.S.T.C. 19396 (2d Cir.
1952) (involving nonrecourse loan).
60. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §643(a)(3). Although these proceeds may create taxable
gain to the trust, so long as the terms of the trust do not allow such funds to be
distributed to the beneficiaries, they will not be includible in trust "income." See also INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §643(b).
61. Victor W. Krause, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971).
62. Id.
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This plan was first recognized in David Keith. 3 Pursuant to a divorce
proceeding, the taxpayer and his wife transferred property in trust for the
benefit of themselves and their son. The trust instrument expressly directed
the trustees to discharge the indebtedness of both grantors. To accomplish
this and other objectives associated with the divorce, the trustees were
authorized to raise the necessary funds by selling or encumbering trust
property. In order to remove the resulting encumbrances or to restore the
value of assets sold, the trustees were to create a sinking fund with 1/3
of the trust income. This plan was implemented and by 1930 all of the
4
grantors' debts were liquidated, and the sinking fund was established.
Several years later the Commissioner sought to tax the grantors on the portion
of trust income applied toward the sinking fund. 5 The Board of Tax Appeals
found that the sinking fund payments made subsequent to the complete discharge of the indebtedness were neither subject to the grantors' control nor
applied for their benefit within the meaning of section 167 (now 677). 66
Thus, trust income in years following the discharge was held not to be
attributable to the grantors. 67 Since the tax consequences in the year of
discharge were not at issue, all tax exposure arising from the debt payments
was avoided.
The rationale of David Keith was reaffirmed in Estate of Annette S.
Morgan" and is not a well established tax planning tool.69 Furthermore,
the decision of Victor W. Krause70 resolved any doubts regarding the tax
consequences arising under section 677 in the year the indebtedness is discharged. In that case, the Tax Court held that if the trustee has the discretion
to apply income to the grantor's obligations, then the grantor is taxed on
the accrued income as of the date of the discharge.-1 This result obtains
regardless of whether the trust income is actually applied toward the indebtedness since section 677 is triggered by the mere discretion to distribute
income for the benefit of the grantor. However, if the obligation is discharged
63. 45 B.T.A. 644 (1941).
64. Id. at 645-46.
65. Id. at 646.
66. Id. at 647.
67. Id.

68. 316 F.2d 238, 1963-1 U.S.T.C. 9401 (6th Cir. 1963), aff'g per curiam 37 T.C. 981
(1962); see also Victor W. Krause, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971). But see Clifton B. Russell, 5 T.C. 974
(1954) (where grantor was taxed when he loaned money to the trustee for payment
of a preexisting encumbrance assumed by the trust); Rev. Rul. 57-564, 1957-2 CuM. BULL.
328 (grantor was taxed when terms of trust instrument specifically direct the course of
action to be followed by the trustee in borrowing the money).
69. In recent years this plan has been most popular in the field of net gifts when
the donee is required to pay the donor's gift taxes resulting from the transfer. If the
property is transferred in trust under such conditions, the Commissioner has asserted
that the application of trust income toward these taxes discharges the legal obligation
of the grantor (i.e., his gift taxes) and is, therefore, a distribution for his benefit within
the meaning of §677. The issue is essentially the same as when the property is encumbered
with the grantor's preexisting indebtedness; the only difference is that in the net gift
instance it is the grantor's gift taxes that encumber the property.
70. 56 T.C. 1242 (1971).
71. Id. at 1246.
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prior to the realization of trust income, then there is no income that may be
attributed to the grantor, and all tax liability under section 677 is effectively
avoided.

72

In these circumstances it is painfully apparent that the grantor is receiving,
tax free, the same benefit held taxable to the grantor in Blumenthal. The
only difference is that under the David Keith scheme the benefit is conferred
with borrowed money in a lump sum discharge rather than from the direct
application of trust income. In either case, the trust ultimately bears the
burden; however, when trust income is finally applied under the above
plan, the trustee is the obligor, not the grantor. The result is identical to a
full assumption of liability - the issue that has troubled courts throughout
the application of section 677. In instances when indebtedness is assumed on
transfer, section 677 is inapplicable because the benefit did not arise from
the operation of the trust. In the David Keith plan, the benefit arises from
the operation of the trust, but section 677 is still inapplicable because the
specific operation does not include trust income. With such a narrow scope
of view, it is essentially impossible to accurately determine the true taxable
benefits accruing to grantors who transfer encumbered property in trust.
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE TRANSFER IN TRUST: THE ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH OF THE PART-SALE, PART-GIFT CONCEPT

As the inadequacies of section 677 have become increasingly apparent,

the Commissioner has sought to develop an alternative rationale for
determining the tax consequences of using encumbered property as a trust
corpus. In this effort, attention has been focused on the transfer in trust
rather than the subsequent trust operation.
When property is conveyed in trust for no consideration, the transaction
is treated as a gift.7 3 Traditionally, the grantor has realized no income from
such an event since any gain that he might have accrued from appreciation
in value was deferred by transferring his basis to the trust.7 4 However, when
encumbered property is the subject of the transfer, the Commissioner has
begun to assert that the discharge or assumption of the grantor's obligation
is a taxable benefit extended by the trust as consideration for the receipt
of the property. Under this theory, the transaction is characterized, not as
a pure gift, but as a part-sale, part-gift transaction.75
72. Although the question has never been litigated, it would appear that the distribution of trust funds from a depreciation reserve would also avoid the purview of §677.
Normally depreciation deductions are allocated among the beneficiaries in proportion to

their share of trust income. However, TREAS. REG. §l.167(h)-l(b) provides that any portion
of the deduction may be allocated by the trust instrument to the trustee for the purpose of
maintaining a depreciation reserve. It would seem that this cash reserve would not be
trust "income" since any gross income retained by the trustee would be reduced by the
deduction for depreciation. Accordingly, any payment on encumbering debts made from

this fund would not be attributed to the grantor under §677.
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§2511(a), 2512(b).
74. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1015.
75. See Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 1971-1 U.S.T.C.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

9475

(N.D. Miss.

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 5
1976]

ATTRIBUTION OF INCOME UNDER SECTION 677

As a partial sale instead of a pure gift, the transfer in trust of encumbered
property is no longer considered a tax free event.78 The amount of the encumbrance assumed or discharged is the amount realized in the sale portion
of the transaction. From this amount, the grantor is entitled to restore his
adjusted basis as a tax free return of capital, but any amount realized in
excess of basis is recognized as taxable gain.7 If the property transferred consists of capital assets held for more than six months, the resulting income
will be taxed as long term capital gain.- As before, the grantor's basis will
be transferred to the trust, but in addition to the normal credit to basis for
gift taxes paid on the transfer, the trust is also entitled to increase its basis by
the amount of gain recognized by the grantor.7 9
The characterization of a transfer as a partial sale depends on the grantor's
receipt of consideration in the form of relief from a legal obligation. The
approach brings to the fore once again the troublesome issue of the assumption of liability. If the trust formally assumes a personal obligation, then the
benefit to the grantor is reasonably dear under notions of Old Colony
Trust,80 but the issue is inevitably complicated by the transfer of property
subject to nonrecourse encumbrances. In this context the Commissioner has
applied the Crane doctrine s l and broadly asserted that the amount of the
encumbrance is always realized by the grantor on transfer, regardless of
whether he is personally liable for the indebtedness or whether such liability
is formally assumed by the trust 5 2 This approach provides a comprehensive
method of determining the tax consequences of funding trusts with encumbered property and avoids the limitations of section 677.
The Commissioner, however, has been somewhat reluctant to adopt exclusively the part-sale, part-gift approach, 3 perhaps because it generally
results in the realization of long term capital gain rather than ordinary income
as under section 677. Nevertheless, if the transfer in trust is within the
parameters of Crane, the subsequent application of section 677 should be
76. TREAs. REG. §1.100I-1(e)(1) reads in pertinent part: "Where a transfer of property

is in part a sale and in part a gift, the transferor has a gain to the extent that the
amount realized by him exceeds his adjusted basis in the property. However, no loss is
sustained on such a transfer if the amount realized is less than the adjusted basis."
77. Id.
78. But see TREAS. REG. §1.1245-4(a)(3) for potential recapture.
79. Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§1015(a), (b), (d). See also TREAS. REG. §1.1015-2, -4;
Citizen's National Bank v. United States, 417 F.2d 675, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. %9622 (5th Cir. 1969)
(TiruAs. REG. §1015-4 was held in-alid to extent that it provided a cost basis rather than

transferred basis precluding the tacking of grantor's holding period); Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.

9355 (6th Cir. 1974) (TREAS. REG. §1.1015-2 was

suggested as the appropriate regulation controlling basis computation for part-sale, part-gift
transfers in trust).
80. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. g9475 (N.D.
Miss. 1971), affd per curiarn, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
81. See notes 8, 47 supra.
82. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19355 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1975) (the Sixth Circuit held for the first time that
encumbered gifts in trust are within the parameters of Crane).
83. See, e.g., Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 491 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir,
1974), acquiesced in, 1973-2 Cum. BuLL. 4.
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precluded. The rationale oE Crane mandates a realization of the indebtedness
that closes the transaction as to the grantor, and a gain, if any, will be
recognized only at the time of transfer. The amount of the encumbrance
cannot be realized again during the subsequent operation of the trust. Thus,
while the Crane doctrine provides an effective alternative when section 677
is avoided, it is also apparent that the rationale provides an equally effective
84
defense when section 677 would otherwise be applicable.
CONCLUSION

Despite its limitations, the Commissioner has continued to utilize section
677 in determining the tax consequences of using encumbered property as
a trust corpus. By insisting on a formal assumption before relieving the
grantor of primary liability, an occasional victory has been salvaged when
careless taxpayers fail to meet the technical requirements of local law. s 5
Nevertheless, it is obvious the variety of planning alternatives has enabled
knowledgeable taxpayers to circumvent section 677 with impunity. If
personally liable for the encumbrance, the grantor need only provide for
the formal assumption of the indebtedness or for its payment with funds
other than trust income. If it is possible to borrow without personal liability,
then the property need only be transferred subject to the nonrecourse obligation. Since in negotiating the loan or in drafting the trust instrument the
grantor has exclusive control over these determinative factors, tax avoidance
is inevitable.
To determine the proper tax consequences in the above instances, the
Commissioner must adopt the part-sale, part-gift approach of Crane. This
treatment provides equitable, consistent, and predictable results that effectively
preclude the subsequent application of section 677. Therefore, it is both
necessary and desirable for the Commissioner to recognize the preemption
of this provision and to accept the part-sale, part-gift rationale as the
appropriate method of determining the tax consequences of funding trusts
with encumbered property.
JOSEPH BAIRD LErTm
84. See Citizen's National Bank v. United States, 417 F.2d 675, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9622
(5th Cir. 1969).
85. Typical of the Commissioner's recent applications of §677 is Jack Wiles, 59 T.C.
289 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974), acquiesced in, 1973-2 CuM. BULL.
4. The grantor in that case conveyed property encumbered by a mortgage on which
he was personally liable. Although the inartfully drawn trust instrument apparently required
the trustee to pay the mortgage installments, it was unclear whether there was an express
assumption of primary liability. One clause stated that the trustee was to assume "certain
indebtedness as hereinafter specified." Id. at 301. But no language thereafter provided
for such an assumption. The court ultimately construed the instrument as not providing
for an assumption; therefore, the grantor was found to be primarily liable for the
mortgage. Following Blumenthal §677 was applied, and the grantor was taxed on the
trust income used to pay the indebtedness.
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